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Abstract 
The mind-body problem is analyzed in a physicalist perspective. By combining the 
concepts of emergence and algorithmic information theory in a thought experiment, 
employing a basic nonlinear process, it is shown that epistemologically emergent 
properties may develop in a physical system. Turning to the significantly more complex 
neural network of the brain it is subsequently argued that consciousness is 
epistemologically emergent. Thus reductionist understanding of consciousness appears 
not possible; the mind-body problem does not have a reductionist solution. The 
ontologically emergent character of consciousness is then identified from a combinatorial 
analysis relating to universal limits set by quantum mechanics, implying that 
consciousness is fundamentally irreducible to low-level phenomena. 
 
1  Introduction 
Understanding consciousness is a central problem in philosophy. The literature produced 
through the centuries, relating to the ’mind-body’ - problem, is also vast. A subset of 
some 2500 articles on theories of consciousness can be found in PhilPapers (2018). An 
apparent difficulty lies in the fact that while we normally seek scientific understanding 
from a reductionist perspective, in which the whole is understood from its constituents, 
consciousness has for millions of years naturally evolved into an extremely complex 
system with advanced high-level properties. 
The theoretical difficulties we have faced strongly suggest that fundamentally new ideas 
are needed for the mind-body problem to reach its resolution. In this work it is argued that 
emergence, combined with results from algorithmic information theory and quantum 
mechanics, is such an idea. The meaning of these concepts will shortly be discussed; we 
may here briefly state that emergence relates to complex systems with characteristics that 
are difficult or impossible to reduce to the parts of the systems and algorithmic 
information theory concerns relationships between information and computing capacity. 
We reach the conclusion that the mind is epistemologically emergent, which implies that 
the mind-body problem cannot be solved reductionistically. Reductionistic understanding 
of the subjective aspects of consciousness, like introspection and qualia, therefore does 
not appear possible. The concept of the ’explanatory gap’ (Levine, 1983) is thus justified.  
McGinn, in his influential work ”Can we solve the mind-body problem?” (McGinn, 
1989), also concludes that the mind cannot be understood, but on other grounds. He 
focuses on the ability to understand phenomenal consciousness (Block, 1995), and finds 
that we humans, because of ’cognitive closure’ are not able to solve this ’hard problem of 
consciousness’ (Chalmers, 1995). With the reservation ”the type of mind that can solve it 
is going to be very different from our” McGinn does not fully exclude that consciousness 
can be given some kind of explanation, an optimism not supported in this work.  
We will present a thought experiment featuring a process shown to produce an emergent 
property in the epistemological sense. From a subsequent comparison with the 
neurological functions of consciousness it is argued that consciousness is 
epistemologically emergent. The ontologically emergent character of consciousness is 
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then discussed in light of its complexity considered as a global system. Chalmers (2006) 
finds, on intuitive rather than on formal grounds, that the mind is ’strongly emergent’; a 
term used here in the same meaning as ’ontologically emergent’. 
Definitions are important in this work. There are at least two reasons for this. The first is 
that several aspects of the concepts of consciousness, in particular emergence, are often 
used in different ways by different philosophers, neuroscientists and others. This may be 
understandable on the basis of that consciousness, not least semantically, is an elusive 
concept. The problem is rooted in its unique character, causing attempts for a definition to 
contain circular elements of some kind. The influential early characterisation of Locke 
(1690) ”consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man’s own mind” suffers 
from reference to the subjective term ’perception’. Nagel’s (1974) characterisation ”there 
is something that it is like to be that organism - something it is like for the organism” has 
gained popularity, although ”is like” refers back to the subject itself, that is to 
consciousness. A more exhaustive and recent discussion of possible criteria for and 
meanings of conscious states can be found in Van Gulick (2014). However, either of the 
above formulations sufficiently catches the subjective components of consciousness that 
are referred to in this work, thus we here consider phenomenal consciousness. When we 
discuss other key concepts, attempts will be made to render the treatment more precise, in 
some cases using formalisations from physics and mathematics.  
A second reason for the need for clear definitions is simply that binding arguments require 
precision (Carnap, 1950). The consequence of such specifications may of course be that 
the definitions of some philosophers are excluded; the results should be seen in this 
perspective.  
In the sections to follow we begin by discussing what requirements must be placed on a 
theory that can solve the mind-body problem, assuming physicalism and causality. This is 
conveniently done by employing algorithmic information theory. We draw the conclusion 
that one-to-one representations of consciousness will not constitute explanatory theories; a 
properly formulated theory for consciousness must be less complex than consciousness 
itself. It is subsequently argued that if consciousness is found to be an emergent property 
of the brain, no solution to the mind-body problem can be produced. Predictions of how 
low-level neural processes relate to high-level, emergent conscious behaviour cannot be 
made. To this end, the concepts of emergence and reduction are defined and discussed. A 
thought experiment, illustrating epistemological emergence, is then introduced. An 
argument for the epistemological emergence of consciousness is subsequently presented. 
Turning to ontological emergence, we employ results from quantum mechanics showing 
that the amount of information that can be processed in the material universe is limited. 
We find that this limit needs to be exceeded if consciousness should be reducible in 
principle to low-level neural processes. As a result consciousness is found also to be 
ontologically emergent. Finally the potential for neuroscience to shed light on 
consciousness is briefly addressed. The paper ends with discussion and conclusion.  
 
2  What is required of a solution to the mind-body problem? 
The goal of the mind-body problem research is to find a theory that explains the 
relationship between mental and physical states and processes. The sub-problem which by 
far has attracted the most interest concerns the question how consciousness can be 
understood. We may initially ask the question: what is required from an adequate theory? 
In this work, a ’theory’ for consciousness refers to an explanatory theory, that is a theory 
that shows why a phenomenon or property is the way it is. Merely descriptive theories, 
that describes what phenomena are like, are by themselves insufficient for solving the 
mind-body problem. For a discussion of scientific theories, see Woodward (2017). In the 
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present case, a descriptive theory could be an account of functions of a one-to-one 
computer copy of the cerebral neural network. An explanatory theory, on the other hand, 
should bridge the gap between subjective experiences and the physical matter of the brain.  
Our method of approach will however not be to directly attempt to determine whether the 
subjective per se is reducible to the physical. Instead we will investigate to what extent 
methodological tools for such a reduction, namely the interpretation of the function of the 
cerebral neural network, can be devised. 
Chaitin (1987) has clarified the necessary requirement that a theory must be inherently 
less complex than what it describes; in his terminology it must to some extent be 
’algorithmically compressible’ in relation to what it should explain. Let us illustrate this 
by an example. A relationship y = f(x) has been established to explain a phenomenon, but 
the precise dependence is not known. A series of experiments that generate N data points 
(xi, yi); i:1…N has thus been performed. Clearly, a polynomial Y(x) of degree N-1 (N 
coefficients) can always be fitted through all the data points in an xy-diagram. Is it a 
theory? The answer is no, for the simple reason that Y(x) does not explain anything; it is 
always possible to draw a polynomial of degree N-1 exactly through N data points. Had 
we instead adapted a polynomial of lower degree through all the points, say a second 
order polynomial through 10 data points, then we would have a theory worthy of the 
name; it predicts more than it must. That it is algorithmically compressible means that it 
can be formulated using fewer bits of binary information than those required for 
expressing Y(x). This also holds generally; the formulation of an algorithmically 
compressible theory contains less binary bits of information than the data it represents. 
Simply put: a proper theory must be simpler than the phenomenon it describes, otherwise 
it does not explain anything. 
In this work we will make use of the discrete logistic equation for later comparisons with 
the neurological processes that form the basis of consciousness. This equation can be 
formulated as the discrete recursive relation xn+1 = λxn(1-xn), n:0…nmax, where the positive 
integer nmax can be chosen freely. The discrete logistic equation then iteratively generates 
new numbers xn+1 for increasing values of numbers n. The parameter λ and the start value 
x0 must first be selected. We can now ask: is there an explicit theory for the value xn+1, 
that is is there a function u(k) which satisfies the relation xk = u(k), being algorithmically 
compressible as compared to repeated use of the iterative relationship xn+1 = λxn(1-xn)? Of 
course we can form x1 = λx0(1-x0), x2 = λx1(1-x1) = λλx0(1-x0)(1-λx0(1-x0)) and so on. This 
latter route is not feasible; for large n we will find that the symbolic expression for xn+1 
becomes extremely complex; this way of searching u(k) does not result in a valid theory. 
Alternatively formulated: the binary bits needed to represent the characters of these 
symbolic terms is at least of the same order as the bits representing the numbers x1, x2, 
x3... themselves. Unfortunately, it can be shown that the question we posed must be 
answered in the negative; no matter how we try, it is not possible (except for a very few 
values of λ) to derive a theory, that is a compact, explicit expression for u(k).  
The cause of the problem is that the discrete logistic equation is a nonlinear recursive 
equation. Let us, for a moment, instead consider the simpler linear recursive equation xn+1 
= A+λxn , n:0…nmax, where A is a constant, for which the general term xk can be derived in 
explicit form simply as xk  = x0λk +A(1-λk)/(1-λ) for λ ≠ 1 and as xk = x0 +Ak when λ = 1. 
The formal solution is expressed using only a few mathematical symbols; it is thus 
algorithmically compressible (may be represented by fewer digital bits of information) as 
compared to the solution xk obtained iteratively by forming x1 = A+λx0, x2 = A+λx1 = 
A+λ(A+λx0), x3 = A+λx2 = A+λ(A+λ(A+λx0)) and so on. This explicit solution was 
analytically available because of the low complexity involved in the solution of linear 
equations as compared to nonlinear. Furthermore, the solution for xk is derived 
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mathematically by using well-known axioms and theorems; consequently we can 
theoretically explain the values xk for the linear recursive equation. 
We have here employed examples from mathematics, but the reasoning applies generally 
when we seek any kind of formal explanation or theory for a phenomenon. Thus, a theory 
cannot explain consciousness if it refers to systems of the same level of complexity (like 
other minds). Understanding is only reached from theories that are less complex than a 
full formal representation of consciousness itself, and that relate to already established 
knowledge; in other words they should be algorithmically compressible in relation to 
consciousness.  
To illustrate algorithmic compression we may discuss possible explanations for the 
collective motion of flocking birds. If individual, advanced models are used for the 
motion of each participating bird, an explanatory theory is far away. But a theory that 
identifies laws that are followed by the flocking birds, that is a theory which is 
algorithmically compressed in relation to a one-to-one description of the bird’s individual 
behaviour, is a candidate for a proper theory. But in order to arrive at this theory, a careful 
consideration of the bird’s individual motion must be carried through, in the same manner 
that laws xk = u(k) for the iterative equations just described can only be found through a 
detailed mathematical analysis of successive iterations.    
 
3  Emergence stands in the way 
The emergent character of consciousness is persistently debated in the philosophical 
literature (Kim 1999, Kim 2006, Chalmers 2006). We will here argue that consciousness 
is both epistemologically and ontologically emergent; our definitions of these concepts are 
provided below. Consciousness thus has features that are not reducible to the properties of 
its components. By ’not reducible to’ we mean that the characteristics of the low-level 
components, taken separately, of the phenomenon are insufficient to establish high-level 
properties. A more precise characterization is provided below. By ’low-level’ and ’high-
level’ we refer to the parts of and integrated wholes of a system or phenomenon, 
respectively. An extensive account of these concepts are given in O'Connor et al (2015).  
This conclusion is central to the mind-body problem since it settles the issue of the 
’explanatory gap’ (Levine 1983); an unbridgeable gap exists between the theories we can 
formulate on the basis of the basic neural physiology of the brain and the subjective, 
cognitive function of consciousness. A consequence is that behaviour of consciousness is 
in principle undeterminable, a relationship being of importance when addressing the 
problem of freedom of will. We now turn to investigate the emergent character of 
consciousness. 
 
3.1  Epistemological and ontological emergence 
Emergence as a concept emerged in the literature in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
mainly through the philosopher John Stuart Mill, the psychologists George Henry Lewes 
and Conwy Lloyd Morgan and the philosopher Charlie Dunbar Broad, although already 
Aristotle had touched upon the subject in his Metaphysics. See Corning (2012) for a 
concise review and references. The literature in the field has since expanded significantly 
and criticism against careless use of emergence has been put forth (Goldstein 2013). Thus 
we find it essential to explicitly characterize emergence as it is used in the present work. 
Epistemological emergence is defined in the following way: A high-level property is 
epistemologically emergent with respect to properties on low-level if the latter form the 
basis for the high-level property and if the theories that describe the low-level properties 
cannot predict properties at high-level. 
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Ontological emergence is defined as: A high-level property is ontologically emergent with 
respect to properties on low-level if the latter form the basis for the high-level property 
and if it is not reducible to properties at low-level.  
These definitions are to a large extent aligned with characterizations of emergence in the 
literature. Comparing with Calmers (2006), for example, his definitions of ’weak’ and 
’strong’ emergence are similar, with the exception that he writes ’truths’ rather than 
’theories’ and ’deducible in principle’ instead of ’reducible’. The reason for our choice of 
’theories’ is that the mind-body problem asks for a theoretical explanation.  
The characterization of ’reduction’ is widely debated among philosophers and there is 
little consensus when it comes to details (van Riel and van Gulick 2018, van Gulick 
2001). For simplicity, rather general characterizations will be employed here, with the 
reservation that other characterizations may have an effect on our argument. We will refer 
to two types of reduction: epistemological and ontological. The first is a relation between 
representational items, like theories or models, and the second is a relation between real-
world items, like objects or properties. By epistemological reduction we here mean 
reduction of one explanation or theory to an explanation or theory with lower complexity 
in the sense that the latter is algoritmically compressed with respect to the former. A 
further requirement on epistemological reducibility concerns explicitness. Thus we need 
’reducible’ also to mean ’in principle explicitly solvable’. A differential equation of 
mathematics could be a more algoritmically compressed theory for a physical system than 
its explicit solution, but it is implicit in the same sense that an explanation of human 
consciousness in terms of animal consciousness would be. We do not seek an implicit, 
descriptive theory for a system of interest but rather an explicit, explanatory theory.    
It is reasonable to assume, as van Riel and van Gulick do, that ontological reduction 
should entail ”identification of a specific sort of intrinsic similarity between non-
representational objects, such as properties or events”. We will, for simplicity and clarity, 
here follow Schröder (1998) and preferentially refer to emergent properties rather than to 
emergent events, behaviour, processes or laws. An ontologically irreducible property, if it 
exists, could not be determined by its low-level-properties or behaviour; it could not be 
characterised by a statistical or law-like behaviour in relation to its low-level components. 
Loosely formulated it can be said that its behaviour comes as a surprise to nature. This 
distinction is crucial and we will indeed find in this work that even if causality holds, 
there are systems where extreme complexity can, in an ontological sense, ’shield’ the 
dynamics of a high-level phenomenon from that of its associated low-level phenomena. 
For these systems it may thus hold that a certain high-level property is not implied by the 
system. The system becomes a mere vehicle for the property. An important consequence 
is that these systems are uncontrollable in principle.  
It may be argued that any property or behaviour in a physicalist world would be reducible 
to low-level properties since we assume that the physical is all there is. But this is not 
what is meant by reduction; supervenience does not imply reducibility; see also 
Francescotti (2007) for clarifying the relation between supervenience and emergence. 
The requirements for ontological emergence are indeed harder to satisfy than those for 
epistemologic emergence; the former relates to intrinsic properties of the system rather 
than to knowledge about and theories for the system. As defined above, ontological 
emergence implies epistemological emergence. Note also that we define epistemological 
emergence in an a priori sense (high-level properties should be predictable from those of 
low-level) rather than in the weaker a posteriori sense (high-level properties should be 
explainable from those of low-level). This differentiation is, however, not important for 
the analysis presented here. What we are looking for is the possible existence of relations 
between particular high-level properties and low-level properties or states. In the 
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epistemological case this amounts to the existence of theories that connect the two levels. 
In the ontological case we are concerned with establishing whether a direct relation 
between the two levels is possible in principle. Assuming, as we do here, supervenience 
and causality we know that complex properties of the mind, like consciousness, have 
evolved. But evolution is complex and does not, as we will se, guarantee that ontological 
reduction is possible.  
The term weak epistemological emergence has been used for systems that can be 
simulated on a computer but otherwise would be characterized as epistemologically 
emergent. This definition will be adopted here as well. A possible example of weak 
epistemical emergence is Conway’s game of Life, where theoretically unpredictable 
complex patterns arise on a computer as a few simple rules for a cellular automaton are 
applied during a large number of time steps.     
 
3.2  Emergence and understanding 
Emergence precludes reductionistic understanding. In an era where physicists talk about 
’theories for everything’, emergence tends not to be a welcome concept. It may thus be of 
interest to consider whether limits for understanding the world manifest themselves in 
other ways. The intention is here to, before adressing the complex problem of 
understanding consciousness, briefly outline a general perspective of epistemical limits 
for understanding the world. Epistemically, we may consider at least four categories of 
phenomena and properties in nature in a physicalist perspective. The first two categories 
are at a basic level:  
I. Brute facts. These are indeed also referred to as ’facts without explanation’. To this 
category belong elementary concepts like matter, time, space, charge, particle spin and 
even the physical constants of nature. Of the latter, some 20 are presently believed to be 
independent of each other.  
II. Laws of nature. Examples are Newton’s laws of motion, the law of gravitation, 
Coulomb’s law, relativity theory and the Schrödinger equation.  
The low-level phenomena associated with these two categories cannot be understood in a 
traditional reductionist manner; they simply are. There are no simpler entities that could 
aid in an explanation of them. According to the debated Anthropic principle, the constants 
of nature should be tuned to some extent for there to be a universe at all where conscious 
minds can appear to discuss these matters. It has been shown, however, that there is an 
allowed window of variation for most constants of nature and thus their precise values, as 
they appear in nature, cannot be motivated or understood.     
From a theoretical standpoint categories I and II are perfectly consistent with that any 
scientific reductionistic (non-circular) theory requires a basic set of unprovable axioms. 
Turning to the two higher level categories, we have: 
III. Phenomena that are reducible to brute facts and laws of nature. Most phenomena 
belongs to this category, by virtue of causality. 
IV. Phenomena that are not brute facts or laws of nature, nor reducible to these. These 
are the emergent phenomena. 
In light of categories I and II, emergence is only one of several obstacles for 
understanding the world. Emergence is sometimes criticized as an irrelevant construction. 
To a large extent this appears to be related to supervenience. By assuming supervenience, 
the notion that all processes of the world including consciousness have one-to-one 
physical counterparts, emergence may seem like a contradiction. An intention of the 
present work is to show how emergence can arise even when assuming supervenience, 
and to present evidence for instances of both epistemological and ontological emergence. 
	 7 
Arguments for emergence are predominantly related to complexity, but there are 
exceptions. See for example Silberstein and McGeever (1999) and Gambini et al (2015) 
for a discussion of ontological emergence and non-reducibility related to basic 
phenomena in quantum mechanics. It is however questionable whether this approach is 
fruitful. If, for example, two entangled particles in a quantum mechanical interpretation 
should be assigned emergent properties, in consequence also Newton’s third law should 
be regarded as an emergent property of nature. The latter law states that for every action, 
there is an equal and opposite reaction in terms of forces. The law cannot be assigned to 
individual particles or bodies (low-level); it is manifested only when two or more of these 
are interconnected (high-level). But we do not refer to Newton’s third law as proof of an 
emergent law or property; we simply call it a law of nature. Emergence is mainly related 
to complexity. 
Categories I-III are directly observable in nature. We accept the reality of brute facts and 
natural laws and we can usually identify combinations of these as category III phenomena. 
A falling snowflake, temporarily caught by the wind, exemplifies the latter. But category 
IV phenomena are not identified this way. We are usually accustomed to trying to 
interpret and understand the phenomena we encounter to the extent that occurences of 
category IV phenomena are typically regarded as potential category III phenomena. 
Existence of category IV phenomena is hard to comprehend because of our natural 
insistence to interpret and understand on the basis of brute facts and natural laws. 
Consequently the fact that we have developed an advanced level of natural science 
understanding without introducing the concepts of emergence has sometimes lead to the 
erroneous conclusion that emergent phenomena and properties are of no relevance.   
To summarize, whereas we speak of explanation and understanding of category III 
phenomena, these rely on acceptance of category I and II phenomena as mere facts. The 
latter do not have reductionistic explanations. In this perspective, emergent phenomena of 
category IV are not the only obstacles for our understanding of the world.  
The main focus of this work is on emergence related to complexity. The brain features 
about 80 billion nerve cells (neurons), each connected to thousands of other nerve cells 
via synapses. A reductionistic model of the mind must be able to handle a corresponding 
complexity in order to ascertain law-like behaviour. As we have just discussed, 
algorithmic information theory implies that ’models’ or ’theories’ that cannot be 
algorithmically compressed to a complexity lower than that of the data they describe do 
not measure up. It is however not entirely clear how emergent properties arise. It would be 
of great help if we could actually point to a relevant example. Our approach will be to, 
using a thought experiment, provide an example of a system featuring emergent 
properties, being related to neural networks of the brain but with lower complexity. We 
will subsequently proceed to address emergence in relation to consciousness.  
 
3.3  The Jumping robot 
Our thought experiment is the following. Let us imagine a number of robots that are 
deployed on an isolated island. All robots are designed in the same way. They are 
programmed to be able to freely walk around the island and perform certain tasks. The 
robots can communicate with each other and are also instructed to carry out their duties as 
effectively as possible. If a robot becomes more efficient by performing a certain action, it 
should ’memorize’ it and ’teach’ the other robots the same skill. Let us concentrate on the 
behaviour of one of these robots and call the thought experiment ’the Jumping robot’. 
In order to support the robots to move about freely, their movement patterns are partially 
governed by discrete logistic equations of the form we just described. Let us assume that 
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for controlling the states of each of the robot’s say 20 joints, the iterative equations xn+1 = 
λxn(1-xn) generate new numbers xn+1  in the interval [0,1] when x0 (also in the range [0,1]), 
and λ are set independently for each joint. These numbers affect how the robot should 
coordinate its joints, muscles and body parts, but the robot is programmed only to use 
information leading to safe motion without falling. Let us put λ = λ0, where λ0 is a number 
slightly less than 4. As discussed in section 2, there is no algorithmically compressible 
explicit expression xk = u(k) that would provide a theory and thus an understanding of the 
robot’s motion. Interestingly, it can be shown mathematically that for values of λ in this 
range and for almost any value of x0, consecutive xk, xk+1, xk+2 will seem completely 
random. One should note, however, that the sequence of numbers indeed is deterministic; 
each number in the sequence is unambiguously defined by the former in a long chain.  
Now assume that it would be of great value if the robots could perform jumps without 
falling. An attempt is thus made to provide a robot with this property. From a large 
number of x0 values different sequences of numbers are generated, using the discrete 
logistic equations, in the hope that one of these sequences would correspond to 
movements which when combined would result in a controlled jump by the robot. We 
ignore here that the procedure is obviously cumbersome; the complexity is partly caused 
by the fact that the robot consists of a large amount of joints, muscles and other bodyparts 
that should be coordinated, partly by our ignorance as to what movements the robot would 
need to perform for a successful jump and partly by that the discrete logistic equations do 
not allow control of the movements. After numerous unsuccessful attempts the task is thus 
given up; the robots cannot be taught to jump. 
Instead now initiate robots with random x0 and leave them to themselves for some time on 
the island, after which we return. To our surprise, we now find that several of the robots 
make their way not only by walking, but also by jumping over obstacles. We cannot 
explain how one or more of the robots acquired the new property; no theory is to be 
found. This would entail finding relations xk = u(k) for the logistic equations, which is 
excluded. We could neither simulate the behaviour on acomputer. If so, this would have 
been an example of weak epistemological emergence. Thus the theories that describe the 
low-level robot phenomena cannot predict behaviour at high-level. The robot's ability to 
jump is an epistemologically emergent property. A main point here is that the emergent 
ability to jump per se is both fully comprehensible to us as well as fully plausible in the 
sense that we can imagine that a certain sequential use of joints, muscles and bodyparts 
indeed may accomplish this behaviour, at the same time realizing that some kind of 
chance or evolution beyond our modelling capacity was required in the light of the 
complexity involved. There is no magic involved in the process, rather the behaviour is 
similar to that of random mutations in the genome of an individual organism, producing 
improved characteristics through evolution. The behaviour in this thought experiment, 
however, is not necessarily ontologically emergent since the robot's capacity to jump 
would appear to be reducible to the motions of its finite number of parts. Similar 
conclusions about the emergent properties of nonlinear systems have been reached by 
other authors (Silberstein and McGeever, 1999). 
No account of precisely how the robots acquire the skill to jump is given in this thought 
experiment. Actually, whether evolution or chance is involved is not relevant for the fact 
that a well known property, to jump, has emerged among these particular robots. We 
cannot compute or design this property, and still it emerges. We could, of course, design 
other types of robots, differently built and wired without a connection to the logistic 
equation, that indeed can jump. But emergence should always relate to specific systems; 
similarly as water molecules are much less likely to emerge in a mixture of hydrogen and 
nitrogen than in a hydrogen and oxygen mixture.     
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3.4  The epistemologically emergent character of consciousness 
What then is the relevance of this epistemologically emergent system for the mind-body 
problem? It could be argued that we can make detailed studies of a jumping robot, simply 
ignoring how it reached its emergent state, in order to understand its functions and 
presumably build copies that perform the same movement patterns. We would simply map 
and reconstruct all the detailed states of the robot involved in the dynamics. Maybe we 
could also build consciousness in a similar manner?  
Building a full robot copy, including its complete physical design and built-in software, 
would not solve the problem, however. The copy would feature the same complexity as 
the original robot, including the irreducible logistic equation. As we have seen, a 
procedure of this kind does not satisfy the criteria for a theory and does not constitute a 
path to understanding. The same conclusion holds if we make a simulated copy of the 
robot on a computer; the iterative use of the logistic equation in the simulations would 
amount to a one-to-one copy of the full robot system. A second possibility would entail 
identifying some reduced pattern of robot movements (’reverse engineering’) that still 
would lead to stable jumping performance for this particular type of robots. This 
procedure, however, is not likely to succeed for several reasons. The main obstacle resides 
in the logistic equation itself. Since, in spite of extensive and sophisticated efforts, we 
were unable to design a jumping robot, is quite unlikely that there exists a sequence of 
robot movements, providing stable jumping, simpler than the one generated by the logistic 
equation for the successful case. A second difficulty is that it is quite conceivable that the 
patterns for jumping are non-intuitive, being difficult to reveal for this reason. When the 
computer program AlphaGo beat the world number one ranked player in the game Go in 
2017, an analysis of the game showed that the computer often chose to use non-intuitive 
and seemingly questionable unorthodox moves. AlphaGo reaches its excellence through 
engaging its neural networks in machine learning techniques, foremost by playing an 
extensive set of games against other instances of itself (Silver et al 2016). A parallel can 
be drawn to evolution which does not design but rather ’tries’ different possibilities which 
are then measured in a survival context.     
In conclusion, the Jumping robot provides an example of the epistemological thesis that 
what can be built cannot always be understood. A proper theory for the properties of the 
Jumping robot, being algorithmically compressed in relation to what it explains, stands 
little chance to be developed.  
The roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans features only 302 neurons. The interconnections 
of all its neurons have been mapped. This mapping is an interesting first step towards 
understanding more complex neuronal networks. A bird’s brain has some 100 million 
neurons. Some argue that in a brain of this complexity, there are signs of basic 
characteristics of consciousness. The smallest primate brains feature about 500 millions 
and monkeys about 10 billion. The human brain features 80 billion neurons with some 16 
billion interconnected in the cerebral cortex, being the primary area associated with 
consciousness. The question arises whether the conscious properties of the brain, such as 
thoughts and emotions, can be understood from a theoretical mapping of these neurons. 
We thus turn to investigate the potentially emergent character of consciousness. The 
human brain works along vastly more complex paths than the discrete logistic equation, 
controlling the Jumping robot. Its neurons communicate, in brief, as follows. Via so-
called dendrites, each neuron can obtain electrochemical signals from tens to tens of 
thousands (on average 7000) neighbouring neurons. The contributions from these signals 
are weighted in the neuron’s cell body to an electrical potential; the so-called membrane 
potential. When this reaches a certain threshold, the neuron sends out a pulse, the action 
potential, along a nerve fibre termed axon, which in turn connects via synapses and 
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dendrites to other neurons. The outgoing signal from a neuron has the form of a spike 
rather than a continuous, nonlinear function of the incoming signal. Thus our choice of the 
discrete logistic equation rather than its continuous counterpart for the robot thought 
experiment. Neurons fire typically in the range of 1-100 signals per second (Maimon and 
Assad 2009) but also at higher frequencies (Gittis et al 2010), with signal lengths of at 
most a few ms and with speeds of up to 100 meters per second. The behaviour varies 
between neurons. For networks of neurons, functions called sigmoids, with S-shaped 
dependence on the input signals, provide realistic activation function models of the 
relation between neuron firing and membrane potential.   
Communication within the neural network of the brain thus occurs nonlinearly and 
discretely with a complexity vastly exceeding that of the simple logistic equation. 
Furthermore, evidence has been presented that even the activity of individual neurons play 
a role for conscious experiences (Houweling and Brecht 2007). Consequently it may be 
assumed that a reductionistic theory for consciousness should take into account firing of 
individual, or small clusters of, neurons. In the example of the Jumping robot it was the 
functional value, generated by the logistic equation, that was of interest. For 
consciousness, it is mainly the interspike intervals and patterns of neuronal action 
potentials that are of significance rather than the amplitudes of the action potentials. 
A determining factor for the neuronal firing behaviour is the membrane potential in 
relation to the treshhold for firing. This threshhold is individual for each neuron and 
sensitively determined by the weighted contribution from thousands of other neurons 
through its dendrites. We saw, in the Jumping robot thought experiment, that the 
behaviour of the simple logistic equation is algoritmically incompressible. A proper, 
algorithmically compressed, theory for phenomenal consciousness involving thousands of 
networking neurons, obeying the behaviour outlined above, thus certainly seems out of 
reach. The argument will be substantially strengthened in the next section, as ontological 
emergence is considered.  
Summarizing, we have compared the problem of understanding consciousness, that is 
predicting it from its low-level neural components, with the problem of understanding the 
Jumping robot. We have argued that the robot’s ability to jump is an epistemologically 
emergent property; it was impossible to construct a proper theory that explained how it 
could jump. The major problem lies in that its behaviour is partly attributed to an iterative 
nonlinear function; the discrete logistic function. There is no possibility to construct an 
algorithmically compressed theory for the logistic equation except for some singular 
special cases. Consciousness as a property of the mind is, as we just discussed, grounded 
in the low-level behaviour of a huge network of neurons with interspike intervals that can 
be modelled with a similar iterative theory as for the logistic equation. The robot can 
jump, and we know this ability stems from the coordination of its low-level components. 
The brain can be conscious, and we know consciousness stems from the activity of its 
low-level neurons. But since there is no middle ground, no possibility to reduce collective 
neural activity, generating consciousness, into a compressed theory, we are facing an 
explanatory gap between individual neuronal activity and consciousness. 
Thus there is strong evidence that consciousness, and similarly subconsciousness, is 
epistemologically emergent. In the same way that the Jumping robot's behaviour cannot be 
described reductionistically, the properties of consciousness cannot be epistemologically 
related to the properties of low-level neurons, it cannot be represented in a reductionistic 
theory. In consequence, the mind-body problem is reductionistically unsolvable. 
It may finally be noted that mental processes involve an additional, well known, 
complexity, not necessarily related to emergence: they cannot be scientifically related to 
measurable properties in the same manner as movements of the robot parts are linked to 
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its externally measurable ability to jump. The phenomenological, or subjective, conscious 
properties of the mind are predominantly accessible internally or subjectively, not from 
externally distinguishable physical states. Our focus is here on emergence, so we will not 
dwell further on this difficulty.  
 
3.5  The ontologically emergent character of consciousness 
We may now ask whether consciousness is also ontologically emergent; are the properties 
of consciousness irreducible to the lower level states and processes that form the basis of 
consciousness, the ones that consciousness supervene on? Although having discussed in 
section 3.1 what we mean by ’reducibility’, we will now proceed to discuss in more detail 
the ontological limits of reduction. Let us return to the example of the Jumping robot. The 
property to be able to jump was at this stage not deemed ontologically emergent for the 
reason that in an objective meaning this property was an option that seemed reducible to 
the system, although its details were unknown to us. By ’objective’ we refer to that the 
various possible sequences of numbers being generated by the discrete logistic equation, 
of which at least one potentially lead to jumping behaviour, correspond to an amount of 
information that is manageable in principle. This latter statement demands clarification, 
since we now have made contact with the consequences of quantum mechanics and 
information theory for ontological properties.   
It has been shown (Lloyd 2002, Davies, 2004) that the information storage capacity of the 
universe is limited by the available quantum states of matter inside the causal horizon. 
The latter is the distance, limited by the finite speed of light, outside which no events may 
be causally influential. It is found that the order of 10120 bits of digital information may be 
contained within this horizon. The fact that this ’ontological information limit’ is an 
estimate is not essential; what matters here is that information storage capacity is 
universally limited to a magnitude of this nature. A property that is associated with a 
complexity transcending some 10120 bits of digital information can be characterized as 
ontologically emergent since then there is no possibility, even in principle, to connect it 
with the low-level phenomena on which it is based. This property is physically 
irreducible. The point made here is that quantum mechanics, which provides the basis for 
physicalism, limits the number of achievable states in nature and thus also implies 
ontological restrictions. This circumstance is usually absent in discussions of ontological 
emergence. It should be noted that ’ontology’ is used in this work in the traditional, 
philosophical sense and not as a reference to properties of or interrelationships between 
entities used in computer science and information science.  
An ontological information limit may be hard to digest and a natural reaction would be to 
claim that real processes and properties simply develop in the world, without any relation 
to its computational capacity. We should however realize that our quest, the topic of this 
paper, is an epistemologic one although we are investigating the ontological behaviour of 
the world. This entails using theoretical concepts like computability. Applying these to the 
world, we find that certain phenomena indeed feature a complexity to the degree that their 
appearance comes as a ’surprise’, their complex behaviour is not immediately given by 
the state of the world.  
The situation is analogous to that of mathematics. Here Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory 
constitutes an axiomatic system for generating the truths (theorems) of standard 
mathematics including algebra and analysis. The system of axioms is quite limited, but the 
number of theorems that can be deduced is vast, covering most of mathematics. However, 
in 1931 Gödel showed that there exist true propositions of this system that cannot be 
proven inside the system. These propositions can, however, be proven by adding axioms, 
that is by stepping outside the system. The epistemological point we are making here is 
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that the physical states of processes and properties in the world may imply subsequent 
states, the occurrence (truth) of which are not reducible to present states. We cannot step 
outside the world to decide whether the former will appear or not, but we can however 
ascertain that their potential appearance is undecided. In mathematics, Gödel-undecidable 
propositions usually feature a complexity related to infinite sets that, although they may 
be dealt with, have a power extending outside of the system. Turning to the real world, its 
limitations in representing properties come not from dealing with infinity but from its 
discrete character, governed by quantum mechanical laws. 
To shed some light on the implications of the information limit discussed above, we may 
ask what it would take for the Jumping robot’s ability to jump to be classified as an 
ontologically emergent property rather than merely an epistemically emergent one.  
Let us assume that a Jumping robot can be studied in detail while successfully performing 
a jump. To this end, sensors have been built into its joints and muscles. For a proper jump 
we require that both feet are above ground at some instant in time and that both feet 
thereafter touch the ground for a certain time whilst the robot’s centre of gravity remains 
above some certain height. As the robot satisfies these criteria, the corresponding 
positions of joints and muscular strengths used are measured. The task is now to reduce 
these to the low-level components of the robots, including the iterative equations that 
control its movements. Had these equations been the simple linear recursive equations 
discussed in section 2, reduction would have been a relatively easy matter. Assuming λ is 
given, we could simply measure its values xk  at time instants k and easily solve the 
explicit relations xk = u(k) of section 2 for the values of x0 that leads to the measured 
behaviour. But the Jumping robot is governed by the nonlinear recursive logistic equation 
for which no explicit relation xk = u(k) exists. Thus it is very hard to determine values of 
x0 that must be chosen for jumping behaviour. The more time steps being involved in the 
process, the more complex the logistic equation becomes, as shown in section 2. Actually, 
after some number of time steps, its algorithmic complexity violates the ontological 
information limit discussed above. We may calculate a simple estimate of this limit as 
follows.           
A basic assumption for the robot in the thought experiment is that its motion is partly 
controlled by discrete logistic equations, having the recurrence form xn+1 = λxn(1-xn). 
Using extended ASCII 8 bit digital representation of each character of the formula, it is 
seen that there are two occurences of ’xn’ on the right hand side, each requiring 8 digital 
bits of information (omitting index n). The first three recurrences are x1 = λx0(1-x0), x2 = 
λx1(1-x1) = λλx0(1-x0)(1-λx0(1-x0)), x3 = λx2(1-x2) = λλλx0(1-x0)(1-λx0(1-x0))(1-λλx0(1-
x0)(1-λx0(1-x0))). It is seen that there is a doubling of the number of occurences of the 
initial state ’x0’ for each step to higher order recurrence. Focusing on x0 alone, 
disregarding other characters in order to arrive at a maximum requirement, we find that 
the number of occurences of x0, as function of recurrence order n+1, is 2n. Taking into 
account the number of bits needed to represent x0, xn+1 represents 8·2n bits of information 
with regards to x0. Solving the inequality 8·2n  > 10120, we obtain n > 395. This number is 
an approximative, upper limit of the number of recurrences needed to obtain an expression 
with an information content exceeding the information storage capacity of the universe; 
the ontological information limit. An expression of this complexity and size hence cannot 
have an ontological representation. If n > 395 iterative time steps of the logistic equation 
are required for the robot to jump, this behaviour would come as complete surprise to 
nature. There would be nothing in nature pointing towards this property; there is no 
reason for it to appear. The amount of information required to relate the property to its 
underlying low-level states is simply not available. There is no ontological contact 
between the robot’s ability to jump and its low-level components.  
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It may also be helpful to discuss a specific example of an ontologically emergent system 
in nature. To this end, we note that emergence rarely is associated with the results of 
human activities, with design, but rather with evolution; the self-development of nature. 
Evolution has through natural selection access to a tremendous diversity of degrees of 
freedom and features a huge potential to generate emergent systems. An example from 
chemistry is myoglobin, an important oxygen binding molecule found in muscle tissue 
(Luisi, 2002). Here 153 amino acids are interconnected in a so-called polypeptide chain. 
Since there are 20 different amino acids, the number of possible combinations of chains 
amounts to the enormous number 20153 ≈ 10199, which corresponds to a number of digital 
bits much larger than 10120. Myoglobin thus features an ontologically emergent property; 
the molecule is, in terms of its optimized high oxygen affinity, not reducible to its low-
level constituents. It could only evolve, it could not be designed. 
It could possibly be argued that in order to free memory, by employing some efficient 
algorithm, only the most relevant data relating to each computation need be stored. This 
is, however, not a successful path for the following reason. In nature, changes do not 
come and forces do not act instantaneously. All effects of interactions in nature, that is 
changes of state, are in fact due to combinations of the four basic forms of interaction 
through exchange of particles called bosons. This interaction indeed takes a finite time; 
the lower limit is given by a key relationship in quantum mechanics called Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle (Lloyd, 2002). The limiting time is proportional to Planck's constant 
and inversely proportional to the system’s average energy above the ground state, which 
for a one kilo system means that no more than 5·1050 changes of state are possible per 
second; a theoretical limit for a quantum computer. In the entire visible universe, which 
dates back some 14 billion years and has a mass of about 1053 kg, not more than about 
10121 changes of quantum states have occurred. Although this is a huge number it is not 
infinite. The universe’s ’capacity to act and compute’ is thus limited (Wolpert 2008). 
Since several quantum states are involved in each computation of the oxygen affinity of a 
polypeptide chain, it is clear that quantum mechanics sets a universal limit, prohibiting 
reduction to the amino acid low-level components. 
For a moment returning to the Jumping robot, we can now see why it is not possible to 
explain its ability to jump through computer simulation. In such a scenario, initial x0 
values need to be guessed for all the 20 limbs. Assuming 10 digit accuracy is required, the 
number of possible initial states of a robot to be considered would thus be (1010)20 = 10200, 
a value in conflict with the computational limit just discussed.  
It is now argued that consciousness is ontologically emergent. The line of reasoning is the 
following. First we specify what it takes for consciousness to be ontologically emergent. 
Next we specify physical assumptions made for the neural network of the brain. It is 
subsequently argued that the information associated with conscious states, in relation to 
low-level neural states, exceeds the ontological information limit discussed above. 
Consciousness is thus found to be ontologically detached from its low-level neural states, 
whereupon ontological emergence follows.   
We will reason as follows. Referring to the previously stated definition, consciousness is 
ontologically emergent if it cannot be reduced to the properties or behaviour of its low-
level states. This, in turn, means that no explicit relation can be established, not even in 
principle, between consciousness and the activity of the neural network that generates it. 
Hence we want to find out whether such a relation, that reduces consciousness to its low-
level states, can be expressed or not.  
At this point we need to specify the details of the neural network that we assume as the 
basis for consciousness, out of which some will be used for our argument. Causality and 
supervenience, in the sense that the properties of consciousness correspond to certain 
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configurations of low-level neural states, are both assumed. Whereas the cerebral cortex 
contains some 16 billion neurons, a lower number of interacting neurons appears 
sufficient for consciousness, perhaps of the order a billion neurons. We also assume that it 
is only particular configurations of these, in terms of their interrelations, and certain 
temporal neuronal activity that generate phenomenal consciousness. Each neuron is, on 
average, connected to about 7000 other neurons, affecting its behaviour. Individual 
neuronal activity is assumed important (Houweling and Brecht 2007) for consciousness. 
Furthermore we assume that there is a lower time limit for collective neural activity where 
consciousness cannot be upheld. It has been experimentally shown that after stimulation 
of neural brain activity there is a delay before the individual becomes conscious of it. A 
”substantial duration of appropriate cerebral activity (up to about 0.5 s) is required for the 
production of a conscious sensory experience” (Libet 1993). Later experimental studies 
(Soon et al 2008, Klemm 2010) support these results. 
We will now consider the amount of information associated with a conscious state, in 
terms of its relation to its low-level components, the neurons. Our approach will be to 
make a lower estimate, employing a crude and simplified model, and determine its 
implications. Thus we start by assessing the information processes associated with an 
individual neuron k. We assume it is, through its axon (output) and dendrites (input), 
connected to K neurons. Since the primary action of the neuron in its network contribution 
to consciousness is to fire action potentials at certain rates and in certain patterns, it is 
natural to focus on information relating to whether the neuron, upon integration of its 
input, reaches the threshold potential for firing or not. The associated membrane potential 
is found from adding the membrane’s electric self-potential to the integrated contributions 
from other connected neurons. The threshold potential for firing is as mentioned earlier a 
nonlinear function of the cell potential. For simplicity we here model this function as a 
third order polynomial. Mathematically, the membrane potential 𝑍!!!!  of neuron k at state 
n+1 at time 𝑇!!! can be symbolically modelled as 𝑍!!!! = 𝑎! + 𝑏!𝑠! + 𝑐!𝑠!! + 𝑑!𝑠!!, 
where 𝑎! , 𝑏!, 𝑐! and 𝑑! are constants, unique for each neuron, and 𝑠! =  𝑍!!  !!!! , a sum 
over the action potential contributions from neighbouring neurons. Note that self-
dependence on the previous state is included.  
Of primary information theoretical interest is the formal representation needed for 
expressing 𝑍!!!!  in terms of its dependence on signals from neighbouring neurons for the 
full time 𝑇! of neuronal activity required for conscious mind processes to take place. 
Using a computer math program (in our case Maple), it can be shown that the number of 
characters required to express 𝑍!!!!  scales with temporal states approximately as 
10·(3K)n+1. Transformed to binary code (extended ASCII, for example), each character 
corresponds to 8 digital bits of information. Thus for K = 7000, the information content 
associated with state 𝑍!!!!  entails some 8·10·(21000)n+1 digital bits. Assuming an average 
interspike interval of 0.1 s, this is an amount of information that does not reach the 
ontological limit within the 𝑁 intervals that need be accounted for. This is concluded from 
estimating nmax = N = 0.5/0.1 = 5, where 𝑇! = 0.5 s is assumed. However, and importantly, 
account need also be taken for the significant number of neurons that fire at interspike 
intervals towards the estimated minimal interval of about 0.001 s (Softky and Koch 1992, 
Paré and Gaudreau 1996). We now find that already for average interspike intervals of 
0.018 s (thus for N = 0.5/0.018 ≈ 27) the number of bits representing 𝑍!!!!  becomes 
8·10·(21000)28 ≈ 8·10122, exceeding the ontological limit 10120. The result, in terms of 
nmax, is relatively insensitive to K and choice of model for 𝑍!!!! . Choosing K = 2000 and 
12000, for example, yields nmax = 31 and 25, respectively, with corresponding interspike 
intervals 0.016 and 0.020 s. Instead using a second order model for 𝑍!!!!  results in the 
similar character scaling 12·(2K)n+1. Again 𝑇!  = 0.5 s is assumed. Thus, since the 
spectrum of action potential firing cannot be ontologically represented within the 
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ontological information limit, we find that conscious high-level processes cannot be 
reduced to, or related to, neuronal low-level processes. 
It should be remarked that the above estimate significantly underrepresents the 
information content associated with the dynamics of a single neuron. For example, its 
dendrites are not identical, the biological and chemical modelling of which would 
substantially increase the number of bits needed to represent 𝑍!!!! . Furthermore, we have 
only studied a single of the 16 billion neurons of the cerebral cortex. Thus we may safely 
argue that the information content associated with neural processes for consciousness 
exceeds the ontological limit; consciousness is ontologically emergent.   
To sum up, complex systems of the world, like the Jumping robot and myoglobin, develop 
or evolve. The properties of these systems, such as ability to jump and oxygen affinity, 
supervene on the systems. Some properties come as surprises in the sense that they cannot 
be reduced to anything less than the behaviour of the full system itself. These are the 
emergent properties. Epistemologically, we refer to the associated system (like the bits 
and parts of the Jumping robot), ontologically we refer to the physical universe. The 
notion of algorithmic incompressibility as a diagnostic for emergence is applicable in both 
the epistemological and the ontological cases. If properties of a complex system, being 
acquired through for example long term evolution, can only be represented by the system 
itself, that is if nature, because of the limited quantum mechanical information capacity of 
the world, cannot accommodate a compressed representation of its properties, then the 
system features ontologically emergent properties. The neural system relating to 
consciousness features an incompressible character due to its nonlinear complexity as 
described above; thus it is ontologically emergent. As a consequence of the definitions in 
section 3.1 it follows that consciousness is also epistemologically emergent. 
 
3.6  Neuroscience 
The neural networks of the brain communicate in discrete nonlinear processes to generate 
cognitive functions such as the abilities to feel pain, think, make choices, experience 
feelings and introspect. If these basic neural processes were linear in their physical 
character, their behaviour could possibly be reduced to a theory. This theory would have 
lower complexity than what it describes since it would be algorithmically compressible. 
Nonlinear systems like the neural network of the brain, however, generally feature higher, 
second order complexity. Since the neural network associated with consciousness thus is 
nonlinear and discrete to its nature, we argue that a theory cannot be produced for it; 
consciousness is emergent and cannot be understood in a reductionistic framework, 
regardless whether we seek a computational theory of mind or some other formally 
reductionistic theory of mind. 
It could be of interest here to briefly discuss a quite different obstacle for understanding 
consciousness. Abandoning efforts for finding theories of consciousness, we may be 
inclined to instead turn to the possibility of artificially designing consciousness. In 
neuroscience there is a search for 'neural correlates of consciousness' (NCC), which form 
the neural processes in the brain that are directly linked to the individual's current mind 
activities. Although consciousness is an emergent, unexplainable property of the brain 
there is in principle nothing that precludes design of artificial consciousness - the 
possibility of imitating evolution is always open. But a problem is that we cannot be 
certain that the goal is achieved.  
Let us say that NCC:s indeed can be identified to an extent that serious attempts to create 
conscious processes in artificial brains can be made. On each such experimental attempt, 
the function must be ensured - the system must be diagnosed. Otherwise there is the 
possibility that we have designed an advanced system that externally behaves like a 
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consciousness but actually lacks mental processes. But a problem with this approach is 
that essentially no limit exists for non-cognitive ’intelligence’ of advanced computer 
programs. These would then, properly designed, be able to pass any kind of Turing test. In 
these tests, where the respondent is hidden so that the person performing the test does not 
know whether it communicates with a human or a machine, any machine producing 
similar responses as humans are deemed intelligent on the level of a human.  
The Turing test is valuable for testing intelligence, but is obviously unreliable for testing 
consciousness. But what would then be an adequate diagnosis? Current definitions of 
phenomenal consciousness provide an answer: we must ensure that the system can have 
subjective experiences. But since all measurement of the functions of consciousness must 
be done externally, that is by laboratory personnel using diagnostic equipment, the 
system’s internal cognitive functions cannot be measured directly. There is simply no 
information externally available from the system that would be indistinguishable from that 
which can be produced by an advanced, but unconscious, computer program. We could be 
facing an intelligent robot, without ability for conscious behaviour. This is, as mentioned 
elsewhere, therefore not a viable route for solution of the mind-body problem.  
In short: to understand a system implies the possibility of constructing it, with all of its 
functions. But construction does not imply understanding; since the intended functions, 
like generation of conscious thoughts, cannot be experimentally verified we thus cannot 
say with certainty that they are in place nor that we understand them.  
 
4  Discussion 
It is argued in this work that consciousness cannot be explained or understood, since it is 
an emergent property of the brain. To understand how emergence can be realized in a 
system we invented the thought experiment of the Jumping robot. Although jumping per 
se is well known to us (there are, for example, certain types of robots that can jump) there 
was no way that we could coordinate this particular robot’s limbs, joints and muscles to 
produce stable jumping behaviour. Left to its own device, it nevertheless found a way to 
jump. The property of being able to jump emerged. Similarly, we are well acquainted with 
consciousness as a fenomenon, as well as its low-level basis, the neurons, but it is here 
argued that we are epistemically unable to compose an overall theory for consciousness 
from their behaviour.         
The line of reasoning relies on the definitions of emergence and reduction employed. Both 
these concepts can be defined differently. While efforts have been made to align the 
definitions used with those frequently used in the literature, it will be of interest to see 
whether alternative definitions may change the conclusions of this work.  
The theoretical approach has not been to explain why the subjective per se is irreducible 
to the physical. Instead we show that the methodological tools which are required for such 
a reduction, namely models of neurons for establishing the function of cerebral neural 
networks, are fundamentally insufficient because of the complexity of these networks. 
Since non-reductive physicalism is consistent with the present analysis, there are 
similarities with Davidson’s theory of Anomalous monism (Davidson, 1970). The 
Anomalism Principle of this theory claims that there are no strict laws on the basis of 
which mental events can be predicted or explained by other events. This work provides an 
explanation for the non-existence of such laws.  
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5  Conclusion 
In this work we have argued for non-reductive physicalism; mental states supervene on 
physical states but cannot be reduced to them. In a physicalist analysis of the mind-body 
problem, resting on results from mathematics and physics, the concepts of algorithmic 
information theory and emergence are used to argue that the problem is unsolvable. The 
vast neural complexity of the brain is the basic obstacle; from a thought experiment it is 
shown that even a much simpler but related nonlinear system may exhibit 
epistemologically emergent properties. Reductionistic understanding of consciousness is 
thus not possible. Neuroscience will continue to make progress - we will almost certainly 
find, for example, the cognitive centra that are active at certain stimuli or thought 
processes, and we may even be able to construct conscious systems - but emergent 
cognitive phenomena like qualia, feelings or introspection may not be expressed in a 
theory. The 'explanatory gap' cannot be bridged. 
We furthermore argue that consciousness is ontologically emergent; there is no 
possibility, even in principle, to reduce its characteristic properties to the low-level 
phenomena on which it is based. The limited quantum mechanical information and 
computational capacities of the world present unsurmountable obstacles. A basic example 
of ontological emergence, featuring less complexity than consciousness, is discussed, 
namely the oxygen affinity of the protein myoglobin. The main argument is that if 
properties of a complex system, being the result of for example long term evolution, can 
only be represented by the evolution of the system itself - that is if nature cannot 
accommodate a reduced representation of the system - then the system features 
ontologically emergent properties. Without an expressible relation to its constituting low-
level components, consciousness in a way comes as a surprise to nature.    
Interestingly, the problem of finding a true theory for consciousness is related to the 
problem of free will. If a theory for consciousness could be designed the mind would not 
be emergent, a prerequisite for free will. This follows from that if an individual's 
behaviour would be epistemically computable or could be simulated, its behaviour would 
be predictable and thus not free. 
Several of the topics touched upon in this work would benefit from a more thorough 
analysis. The ambition here has been to sketch some of the consequences for the mind-
body problem when analyzed using the tools of algorithmic information theory, 
emergence and quantum mechanics. 
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